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DIARY NOTES

DD/S

22 October 1958

1. I asked General Cabell to call Andy Goodpaster and alert him to our desire to put members of the United States Intelligence Board on the White House switchboard. He said that he would do this and let me know so that I could take the necessary action with the Signal Corps Officer in charge of the White House Switchboard. H

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2. Shaf Edwards and [REDACTED] were up to go over the Table of Organization for the Administration and Training Staff of the Office of Security. In the Administration and Support Branch we changed the titles of two Administrative Officers to Finance Officers as well as two additional Administrative Officers to Logistics Officers.

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4. [REDACTED] telephoned to say that [REDACTED] would be in Washington from 27 October to 3 November and that unfortunately they had not been able to come up with a job for him. I told him that I was inclined to take on [REDACTED] and use him in some capacity and that if nothing turned up before he arrived, to get in touch with me.

5. At the Deputies' Meeting General Cabell briefed us on a very frank discussion which he had had with General Cassidy of the President's Board of Consultants. Those items which are of interest to the Office of the Deputy Director (Support) are as follows: H

a. General Doolittle apparently feels that the Agency has taken very little action to implement the recommendations which he made a few years ago when the Doolittle Committee made a study of the Clandestine Services. He feels particularly that there is unnecessary duplication between the Inspector General's Office and the Inspection and Review Staff of the Office of the Deputy Director (Plans). He also

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believes generally that the staff structure in the Office of the Deputy Director (Plans) is too elaborate and should be streamlined considerably.

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c. The Consultants also feel that we are not using our "5412 Committee" sufficiently. There appears to be some evidence that both Mr. Sprague, who frequently represents Secretary Quarles, and Gordon Gray have expressed sentiments along these lines.

25X1A9a d. The Consultants were also unimpressed with our Project Review Committee procedures and seemed to feel that this was merely a rubber stamp. They do not understand why the Comptroller does not have a vote. (At this juncture Lyman Kirkpatrick and [REDACTED] said that the Comptroller function in CIA was not a normal one and that what we really needed was a Budget and Fiscal Officer. It was obvious that they had discussed this matter before.)

25X1A9a e. The Committee also feels that we still have too many people walking the corridors looking for jobs. I told the Director that I thought this was pretty well in hand and [REDACTED] expressed this view also. Kirk, however, spoke up and said that it was his opinion that we still had a lot of work to do in this area and that the situation was not as good as it should be. [REDACTED] also spoke up and said he believed that Kirk's estimate of the situation was accurate and that he, too, got a lot of complaints about people who were walking the halls.

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